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Summary: 
Social representation theory encompasses the question of social knowledge processing: its 
construction, relation with action, and evolution. Among other theories addressing the same 
problem, social representation is especially efficient for understanding the evolution of social 
objects. Hereby, the theory is apt to investigate “ hot ” social problems, and has pragmatic 
applications for current societal issues. 
Social representations provide frameworks for group cooperation. This functionalist 
perspective enlightens some of their properties, namely: they are at the same time individual 
and collective; they contribute to group identity; they loop perception and action. The case of 
the social representation of “ eating ” illustrates some of these points. 
                                                 
1 saadi.lahlou@wanadoo.fr. EHESS/LPS. 105 bd. Raspail. 75006 Paris, France. 
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1. A patchwork of theories 
Each scientific approach usually has a good degree of validity for the specific phenomena 
upon which it was originally designed; alas, its explanatory power decreases with distance 
from that original niche. This we all know: it would be crazy to explain air resistance with 
psychoanalysis. Therefore our scientific description of the world has to be a patchwork of 
theories.  
Still, domains overlap, phenomena are intricate, and we quickly drift away when we try to 
encompass our object of study. Furthermore, as any specialist is naturally inclined to explain 
everything with the model (s)he masters [cf. Gould, 1980], crazy attempts where theories try 
to encompass alone phenomena out of their range are not so rare: Marxism and language, 
economics and government, biology and intelligence, etc. One sign that disciplines have gone 
past the limits of their natural niche is often the all-critical style of their approach and their 
limited use of empirical data.  
This problem is especially salient for phenomena at the crossroads of several academic 
domains, because each domain tries to colonize its margin. And this is unfortunately the case 
for the phenomena addressed by Social Representations (SR) theory. SR theory specialized on 
a crossroads, at the articulation between individual and social, and between symbolic and real 
[Moscovici, 1982].  
So, in the patchwork of social science, what is the SR theory’s specific domain of validity?  
SR theory, developed for the study of lay knowledge [Moscovici, 1961], addresses problems 
which are also of concern to other theoretical framework and research traditions. Culture, 
rules, conventions, mediating structures, common sense, common knowledge, habitus, shared 
cognition, mental models, prototypes, pensée sauvage, archetypes, schemata, scripts, 
concepts… are some of the categories with which the phenomena we call “ social 
representations ” have something in common. But the theory invented by Moscovici is 
especially relevant for describing and understanding “ hot ” social issues, - social objects in 
the making or in rapid change -. Why? Because its constructionnist perspective and concern 
with social function [Herzlich, 1972] is apt to take into account the feedback loop between 
social construction and individual thought and practice. 
This concern for studying social objects “ in the making ”, and not as static constructs, draws 
the limits of SR theory’s domain of excellence. Still, SR theory is more than a scientific 
crossroads between social and individual on one way, and thought and action on another. 
Social representations exist with a function of their own. I shall argue here that cooperation is 
the key problem, and I shall present social representations as solutions to this problem. 
To clarify this question, this paper attempts a glimpse at the functional aspects of social 
representation, taking the cooperation problem as a starting point. First, the ecological value 
of cooperation among groups will be highlighted (section 2). Then, I’ll argue that cooperation 
needs to be supported by some social objects, for which the main specifications will be given 
(section 3). I shall then illustrate with the example of eating the type of results an SR 
approach can bring (section 4). 
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2. Co-operation as an organic behavior 
"Unaquaeque res, quantium in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur2 
[Spinoza, Ethics, III: VI]. 
"il y a un point singulier où la société se substitue à la nature, où l'évolution 
sociale prend le pas sur l'évolution bionaturelle. A cet endroit, les deux chaînes 
de réalité se séparent tout en se continuant."3 [Moscovici, 1974, p. 290] 
Entities cannot survive without some effort. We may call things the objects that survive by a 
passive effort of resistance to change, e.g. material objects like rocks or chairs; and beings 
those which act upon their environment to ensure their survival and development. Living 
organisms such as plants or animals, but also supraorganisms, like groups or organizations, 
are of this second kind.  
Survival is, for all beings, a matter of linking perception of their environment to action, in 
order to perform relevant, efficient behavior. Beings that survive act in relevant ways: they 
adapt their action to the context. The link between context and action, seen from the being’s 
perspective, is a perception/action loop, where the “ meaning ” of what is perceived depends 
on “ what may be done ” to or with it, what the environment affords [Gibson, 1986]. In other 
words, this loop includes an interpretation of the environment by the being. 
This interpretation can be more or less complex. Simple organisms without memory exhibit 
rather stereotyped responses. The tick (Tixus Ixodes) standing on a branch will let itself fall if 
it smells butyric acid. This is an adapted action, since butyric acid is contained in the sweat of 
mammals, which are the tick’s prey. The tick is therefore likely to fall on a mammal’s hairy 
back, where it will dig its head in the hot skin, and pump nourishing blood, as well described 
by [Uexküll, 1934]. Here, interpretation is “ hardwired ” in the tick’s biological organization; 
so is the coordination between its internal parts that produce the tick’s behavior from the 
subject’s interpretation of the phenomenal flow. Beings with memory may interpret signs in 
the world as signals triggering useful actions, based on their experience [Pavlov, 1932]. For 
instance, pigeons may pick a lever that supplied them with food in previous training.  
Above this first level of selecting relevant perception/action loops and repeating the 
successful ones, some animals, especially among higher vertebrates, are able to plan and 
perform new behaviors, on the basis of representations of objects [Griffith, 1984]. 
Chimpanzees will pile up crates to reach bananas [Köhler, 1917], dolphins will invent new 
behaviors to obtain fish [Bateson, 1979] etc. They probably intentionally chunk internal 
“ simuli ” [Minsky, 1985] into simulated action chains, linking present situation to expected 
outcome. Whatever the process actually is here, interpretation and coordination are 
“software”, but remain mostly at the individual level. Still, these individual representations 
bring an ecological advantage for those animals, inasmuch as they enable them to cope 
adequately with new objects and situations. 
                                                 
2 “ Every entity, so far as it lies in itself, strives to persist in its own being. ” 
3 “ There is a singular point where society substitutes for nature, where social evolution takes the step to bio-
natural evolution. At this point, the two chains of reality part but still continue one another ” 
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The existence of mental representations among lower animals in the scala naturae remains 
controversial; still their existence among the most common and most extensively studied 
species of primates, Homo Sapiens, is generally accepted, and recognized as a decisive 
ecological advantage in everyday behavior. Here, individual coordination between sensory 
and action organs is mediated by individual representations. 
Let us now look at the most complex organisms we know: human groups in the wild, self-
constructed through evolution and history as composite sets of beings and artifacts: “ people 
with culture ”. Like other organisms, these groups are subject to the rules of survival. One 
peculiarity of groups is that action is distributed among participants, but that, unlike in 
individual beings, there is no physical nervous system which links these participants together 
to coordinate perception and action. Still, groups survive in time, and they have grown the 
functional equivalent of the reflex loops of microorganisms or of the individual mental 
representations of vertebrates. What are these social equivalents of individual 
representations? I argue: social representations. 
Social groups turn out to achieve outstanding results when coordinating their action, 
surpassing individual performance. Pyramids, space shuttles, but also every action and artifact 
of our societies (e.g. ice creams cones, television, conferences) are the product of complex 
social coordination, aiming at common goals and distributing action among thousands of 
beings and things. Intentions and plans, building on previous acquaintance, are 
communicated; actions are executed locally by individuals or small groups and contribute to 
the emerging or maintenance of larger social patterns. Here, interpretation and coordination 
rely on mnemonic systems or objects that transcend the individual. Those social constructs 
are, through culture and education, projected or transcribed in symbolic forms, and reified in 
artifacts (e.g. tools, plans, monuments, documents, institutions). 
In doing so, groups make available to individuals these symbolic representation systems 
which are the products of collective cultural development.4 Therefore individual humans 
benefit of complex symbolic thought and reasoning, and may produce, as individuals, 
amazingly sophisticated behaviors involving even objects absent from the local context. 
Symbolic thought proved efficient, as it brought us to the top of the ecological chain.  
As we see, those social constructs are the same as those that individuals use in their everyday 
life in their relation with the beings and things which constitute their social world. 
These social objects, the constructs used by these groups and individuals to cope with their 
world collectively, communicating their intentions, negotiating and coordinating their actions, 
are what SR theory studies. They are socially constructed, but used by individuals also. So 
                                                 
4 It may not be superfluous to state here that, as already noted by Freud [1917] there is no thought but social. 
Symbolic ability and the categories of mental life are, for each individual, basically social and learned through 
socialization. The other part of the loop, where individuals contribute to global culture, is essential in a historical 
perspective, but comes afterwards: cultural contributions are usually made by educated adults, not by preverbal 
children. There is no such thing as a non-socialized “ person ”. Even the more basic functions, such as eating, 
embed cultural aspects in their representation kernel: the meal [Lahlou, 1998], the cultural and moral 
determination [Douglas, 1967; Rozin, 1982, 1990; Fischler, 1990] of what is edible (frogs, dogs, larvae...), etc. 
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these constructs link the individual with the group, on one hand, and perception with action, 
on the other hand. Moreover, as we have seen, because their function is adaptive they are 
versatile and ever changing by nature.  
To sum up, social representations are cultural organs shaped by social evolution; they have a 
pragmatic function of supporting group cooperation for a better survival. They are mediating 
structures [Hutchins, 1995] facilitating coordination of activity between humans, and between 
humans and things. Individuals inherit these organs from their group, and use them in 
everyday life. When we talk about a social representation of something (say “X “) by a group, 
we point at the mediating structure for coordinating action between group members for 
constructing and / or coping with “X”. 
Social representation research, as a branch of social psychology, emphasizes two aspects: 
articulation between the individual and the group in the construction of social objects; and 
articulation between the individual and the group in the use of social objects5. Social 
construction and communication are the main concerns for SR theory. The key figure is 
Moscovici’s [1971, 1984] psychosocial triangle, {Ego, Alter, Object}: no object can be 
conceived without social perspective, in the eye of the Other, the socius (“Alter”); conversely, 
relations with the socius are mediated by objects. The psychosocial triangle provides 
framework for analysis of phenomena by re-situating “objects” in their social setting (look for 
the Socius!), and also by reminding the researcher that there are objects at stake in the 
relationship.  
So one of the main distinctive traits of SR theory is that it knows that the phenomena it 
studies stand at a crossroads, and that they are not given nor static, but socially constructed 
and in continuous evolution.  
3. The co-construction of groups and their objects 
Let us now consider the problem of efficient coordination within a social group. Its members 
try to act together with a common intention. Cooperation has two aspects. The first is the 
pragmatic aspect: “ what do we do”. Individuals must use a reference system that contains the 
objects they perceive (the context) or try to construct (the intentions). The second aspect of 
cooperation is the social:“ who are “we”” The fact that the group exists as such, does indeed 
share general frameworks, and is willing to cooperate, is a trivial but essential prerequisite to 
collective action. 
3.1 Pragmatic aspect 
The pragmatic (or cognitive) aspect covers technical coordination and labor distribution. It 
includes general frameworks such as time, space and taxonomies of objects; but also symbolic 
systems (e.g. language) which may describe possible arrangements of the objects in those 
frameworks and specify action. This pragmatic aspect links information to action. 
                                                 
5 The epistemic aspect (link between construction and use at individual level) and the historical aspect 
(construction and use at social level) have been less developed ; exchanges with cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science for the first, and with sociology and history for the last would certainly be fruitful. 
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A good cooperation tool should provide the individuals with guidelines for their own action, 
but in such a way that all those local parts indeed contribute to a single global, coherent 
process. It should, still, appear flexible enough to adapt to variable local contexts. We shall 
see that social representations meet these contradictory requirements. 
3.2 Social aspect 
The social aspect covers the existence of the group as such, and links the individuals to the 
group. It involves notions such as trust, motivation, identity and individual interests. Try to 
organize a bank robbery with a random sample of 10 individuals, and you will see that it is 
not so trivial: sharing the pragmatic reference system and understanding the language is not 
enough for cooperation. This social precondition has strong implications for the construction 
of social objects and coordination modes. It accounts for many traits of the social constructs 
that we may call meta-pragmatic: that is, not specified by the instantaneous necessities of 
efficient action, but rather by the conditions of possibility of this action in a collective 
framework. This is where the theory of social representations becomes necessary, while 
pragmatic aspects could be more or less dealt with by classical cognitive theories. 
3.3 Co-construction  
The two aspects are not independent. Their interaction during history construes both groups 
and objects as cultural entities, and interweaves them. Empirically, the group becomes 
defined by the possibility of communication between its members, and concerted action based 
on its internal social labor division. It is a chicken and egg problem. People who cooperate 
often become a group6; and it is easier for a group to cooperate. This link between action and 
identity is well expressed by the subjective notion of “ participation ” [Levy-Bruhl, 1951] 
which encompasses both aspects. 
But within the group, and towards the object, people occupy different positions. Cooperation 
may include negotiation or conflict. A given state of things at one moment (e.g. social rules, 
distribution of property, ethics, production processes, political system) is the result and 
reification of compromise and “ rapports de force ”. The construction of the social 
representation of an object is a series of fights and influences, a mixture of propaganda, 
propagation, and diffusion, and also of contrasted practices, as Moscovici [1961] 
demonstrated for psychoanalysis. What appears ex-post facto as static tradition may hide a 
                                                 
6 Cooperating, even on accidental basis, contributes to create a group. This is empirical evidence, of which the 
reasons are many. One may be that group identity builds on common history. Also, for individuals within the 
group, there is often a positive feedback between membership and activity, which is mediated by identity. Social 
psychology has shown how role and status, which are identity constituents, are linked with the labor division. 
The role of an individual is the set of behaviors others expect from him or her; and his or her status is the set of 
behaviors this individual can legitimately expect from others [Stoetzel, 1963]. In other words, social identity is 
linked with the individual’s position in the social labor division. Individuals depend upon objects and upon the 
group for their own definition.  
On the other hand, it is obvious that objects depend on the group for their definition. Even objects, which have 
an identical name, will be in fact different between groups: we already mentioned “ food ”, an apparently 
unambiguous functional category, which still may differ from one group to another. The differences may even 
be more striking with objects or categories like gender, kin, god, health, etc. 
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dynamic equilibrium between conflicting interests. Change one thing, and you jeopardize the 
arrangement of many other beings and things. The structure of social objects is often a subtle 
compromise that enables each user to see it as acceptable, although users’ interpretations may 
differ from one another. 
Any object will be a stake, an issue, or a concern for some sets of individuals whose activity 
or interests are involved with this object. There is no neutral object, for its shape and 
properties will matter in different ways to different populations, and might generate conflicts, 
and negotiations. An adequate approach to the problem must consider the various positions of 
actors in respect to the organizing principle of their relation [Doise, 1985, 1989; Palmonari & 
Pombeni, 1984; Clemence et al. 1994]. SR theory faces this problem, and accepts that object 
construction is a result of interaction between actors with different social, historical and 
cognitive perspectives: this is why they are essentially dynamic objects.  
4. Eating for example 
I shall not enter further into theoretical and epistemological discussions. These aspects have 
been discussed with talent by my colleagues, in the course of internal critics and discussions 
with researchers from other academic traditions [see Jodelet, 1984 for a global picture, 
Moscovici, 1989 for a history; Jodelet & Ohana, 1997, for a bibliography]. Although I believe 
that SR theory presents unique and immensely interesting epistemic properties, I found that 
one major interest of this theory is its ability to deal with real societal issues. As the proof of 
the pudding, here is an example, the SR of “ eating ”, upon which I shall try to give a “ taste ” 
of how SR approach can accommodate phenomena. 
Eating is a basic need [Maslow, 1943]. It is also a societal one, although the terms of the 
problem may vary between cultures. It is an everyday behavior, and it is also deeply invested 
with economic stakes. Specifications of the food industry and service rely on what industry 
knows of consumer’s needs and representations. Finally, it is one of the seminal objects of 
social psychology [refer Lewin, 1943]. Considering the immense literature on food, can SR 
theory bring something relevant and new? 
4.1 Method 
Our study first evidenced the structure of the representation by analyzing the content of two 
different sources of empirical data. The first material is of an usual type in SR research [e.g. 
Rosa, 1988]: free word association on the word “ eating ” (“ manger ”), of 2000 French adults 
(a representative sample of continental France), in face to face at-home interviews.  
The other is extracted from a cultural source, a classical reference dictionary (Le Grand 
Robert, French equivalent to the Webster). This dictionary provides, with each entry, a list of 
associated terms (such as synonyms, analogs...). The associated terms of “ manger ” were 
cropped, and then the associates of these associates, yielding 588 associates of “ manger ” in 
the French language. The extensive definitions of the 588 entries obtained were then copied, 
yielding a corpus of about 500 pages. 
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We therefore obtained two corpuses of text: associations by live human respondents, and 
associations by a cultural source. The principle of the method is identical for both sources: 
the source is stimulated with the name of the object, and induced to produce statements 
relating to that object. 
Both corpuses were submitted to statistical analysis of textual data for segmentation and 
content analysis. We used ALCESTE [Reinert, 1986, 1993], a sophisticated segmentation 
software which cuts the corpuses into small text units (answers, or sentences), and then 
clusters together text units with similar lexical content, into classes. Classes are constructed 
on purely statistical criteria based on word stem co-occurrence in text units. Each class 
therefore gathers text units with similar lexical content. The software provides the researcher 
with the typical words and sentences of each class, for interpretation (cf. infra fig. 1 to 6.). 
Each class was considered as a basic element of the SR, following validated interpretation 
procedures [Lahlou, 1996a]. 
4.2 Results 
Interestingly, both sources (humans and Robert) yield a similar structure of 6 elements: 
Desire, Take, Food, Meal, Filling-up, and Living. Individuals indeed refer to a single, 
cultural, paradigm. We shall come back later to this important point.  
The difference is that one of the elements (Take) is almost absent in the humans’ associations, 
and another (Filling up) takes different connotations (quantitative equilibrium in Robert, 
qualitative in humans). Others stay very much the same, including their respective size. 
Classes from the dictionary analysis are shown in Figures 1 to 6. The top list of the classes’ 
typical lexical roots are presented, straight as they come from the statistics listing. A lexical 
root is typical of a class if it appears significantly more frequently in the textual units of that 
class. Units may be truncated, since the software considers together the lexical variants of 
each root (e.g. désir+ stands for désirer, désir, désirant, désirs, désireras, désiré, etc.). More 
loosely said, each class is characterized by the words that are typical of the discourse it 
contains; by analyzing those words one can interpret the content of that class. E.g. class 
“DESIRE” is made of desire, hunger, appetite, thirst… 
dFigure 1: DESIRE7 ésir+, faim, appétit+, soif, satisfaire., envie+, convoit+, assouvi+, 
rassasi+, avidité, apais+, dévor+, avide+, affame+, cupid+, 
content+, besoin+, mourir., arde+, curiosité+, excit+, yeux, passion<, regard+, tendance+, 
attrait+, glouton+, éprouve+, amour, sexuel+, instinct+, honneur+, avoir, brul+, moder+, 
dévorer, soul+, être, aval+, inclination+, creve+, apéritif+, goulu+, creus+, proie+, colère, 
extrêm+, recherche+, aspir+, abstin+, friand+, sensation+, presser., sentiment+, vouloir., 
inf+, claque+, argent+, sa, physique+, joi+, viv+, ivre+, naturel+, force+, porte<, ses, 
plaisir<.  
(desire, hunger, appetite, thirst, satisfy, envy, lust, assuage, satiate, greed, etc. ) 
tFigure 2: TAKE ouch+, attrape+, prendre., main+, nez, attaqu+, embrass+, baise+, 
joue<, mordre., ventr+, gonfl+, qqn, saisir., parole+, battre., lèvre+, 
                                                 
7 English translation of the first lexical items of each class is provided in bold font. 
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ouverture+, doigt+, bras+, ball+, navire+, pied+, serre+, sur, fondre., entrer., avec, ouvrir., 
se, tirer., claque+, coup<, aspir+, tomb+, lui, langue<, visage, jeter., partie<, tenir., passer., 
laiss+, dent+, mouvement+, bouche+, voir., devant, ferme+, arme+, porte<, bout<, contre, 
arrêt+, gueul+.  
(touch, catch, take, hand, nose, attack, embrace, kiss, cheek, bite, stomach, bulge, 
smbdy, seize, speech, fight, lip, orifice, finger, arm, etc.) 
viande+, pain+, aliment+, fruit+, pat+, légum+, animal<, cuire., 
tranch+, bouill+, plant+, couper., salad+, lait+, dent+, morceau+, 
coût+, conserv+, rat+, digest+, porc, mange+, poisson+, sec+, fromage+, gras, végétal+, 
soup+, boeuf+, nourrit+, sucre+, comestible+, suc+, beurre+, tartine+, liquide+, herb+, 
boîte+, saucisson+, trempe+, nourr+, bouche+, maigre+, épaiss+, boire., gibier+, fourr+, 
rumin+, oiseau+, frais+, grain+, grill+, chair+, vert+, chien+, petit+, boul+, prépar+, 
cuiss+, feuill+, gâteau+, croût+, potage, aval+, croqu+, fleur+, fine+, boisson+, chaud+, 
seche+, substance+, froid+, garni+, oeuf+, orifice+, taille+, point+, gros, produit+, arbre+. 
Figure 3: FOOD 
(meat, bread, food, fruit, pasta, vegetable, animal, cook, slice, boil, plant, cut, salad, 
milk, tooth, piece, cost, canned etc.) 
repas+, table+, restaur+, plat+, dîne+, cuisin+, déjeuner, invit+, 
serv+, buffet+, vaissel+, servir., cantin+, festin+, couvert<, fête+, 
café+, menu+, noce+, nappe+, hosti+, gastronom+, soir+, heure<, assiette+, communi+, 
coll+, mange+, ensemble, thé+, convive+, soup+, tasse+, gala+, récept+, jour+, entrée+, 
dessert+, offic+, serviette+, cher+, spécial+, paye<, prépar+, léger+, carte+, pièce+, on, 
frugal+, général+, nuit, mettre., boisson+, région<, cours, verre+, hôte+, milieu+, ou, 
grand+, après, chez, récipient+.  
Figure 4: MEAL 
(meal, table, restaurant, dish, diner, cook (kitchen), lunch, guest, serve, etc.) 
connaître., bon+, sentir., aim+, agréable+, emploi+, goût+, possed+, 
vivre., est, je, vie, éducation, appréci+, ne, idée+, joui<, femme+, 
esprit+, juge<, il, beau+, âme+, amer, apprendre., suivre., moral+, riche+, social+, vit, pas, 
caracter+, que, ressentir., savoir, société+, cet, charmant+, corromp+, accueil, dieu+, 
exquis+, coeur, ouvrage+, valeur<, sentiment+, c'est, vous, assimil+, adopt+, passion<, 
affect+, ai, musique, sens, ador+, habit+, intére<, nature, instinct+, homme+, qualité+, 
travail+, verbe, inf+, fill<, ce, humain+, recevoir., enfant+, me, chose+... 
Figure 5: LIVING 
(know, good, feel, love, nice, use, taste, possess, live, be, I, life, education, appreciate, 
no, idea, enjoy, woman, mind, judgement, he (it), beauty, soul, bitter, learn, follow, 
moral, rich, social, etc.) 
rempl+, épuise+, encombr+, ronge+, sature+, consum+, 
détruire., approvisionn+, sujet+, absorb+, empli+, imbibe+, 
vide+, feu, plein+, farci+, bourr+, chose+, complet+, abreuv+, fatigue+, fortifi+, imprégn+, 
voiture+, dévorer, consomm+, n, placer., garni+, occup+, eau, entier+, gonfl+, rendre., 
fonction+, brûl+, pron+, jusque, gorge+, discours, temps, user., article+, accompli+, trop, 
air, abstrait+, ses, marchand+, soul+, pass+, dissip+, compl+, son, force+, sang+, truffe+, 
dépenser, vill+, entam+, quantité+, se, fer, dévor+, muni+, dépense+, perdre., tout, tête, 
désign+, coeur, fort+, livre+, marche+, racine+, ravitaille+, charge+, bouff+, anal.  
Figure 6: FILLING UP 
(fill up, exhaust, congest, gnaw, saturate, consume, destroy, load, subject, absorb, fill, 
soak, empty, fire, full, cram, stuff, etc.) 
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As one may notice, this social representation contains obvious common sense (the behavioral 
sequence of food ingestion). But it also contains social (Meal) and ethical elements (Living). 
Social representations always exhibit this “ obvious ex post ” characteristic, for they are 
common sense. Still, the actual number of elements, their nature and organization are not 
necessarily trivial, and may even differ from explicit didactic sources as dictionaries or 
manuals. Therefore the SR approach, using the natives psychological material, provides us 
with a description at a level of granularity appropriate for human thought description: no 
neurons, no scientific constructs; just plain natural thought, common sense. SR theory has no 
hegemonic claim to give the right description of how people think or act8, but it strives to 
express it at a level as close as possible to the subjective perspective of lay persons. 
Of course, this is only a lexical projection of the social representation, limited by our 
linguistic investigation method. To remind the reader that the elements have emotional, 
motor, and proprioceptive dimensions, I prefer to represent the elements of the social 
representation “ non verbally ” in the following figure: 
Figure 7: A subjective view of the elements of the social representation of “ eating ” in 
France 
desire
filling up
living
meal
take
food
 
4.3 Discussion 
Now that the framework is set, let us look at some interesting points. Space being limited, I 
shall focus on the following questions: (a) representation and action, (b) social and individual 
representations, (c) social values in representation. More details can be found in [Lahlou, 
1998] 
                                                 
8 Neurological, economic or behaviorist descriptions may be more relevant for other purposes. 
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4.3.1 Representation and action: from structure to process 
What is the link between representation and behavior? Some of the SR elements may be 
motor (e.g. Take), enabling the representation to unfold as a pragmatic script, in context.  
Let us examine a human subject, inhabited by the social representation we just described. 
Remember its elements are associated in the mind, as our free association experiment just 
showed. In a context where hunger (Desire) is present, if acceptable Foods are present, by the 
virtue of association the other elements of the representation will emerge. The representation 
may then naturally unfold into the trivial biological script (Hunger/Take/Food (until) Filling-
up); but this will respect the formal behavior syntax of the relevant Meal according to local 
context (e.g. breakfast, snack, etc.). This script may be acted in context, since the Take is a 
motor element; and will be applied to the actual Foods present in the context. The domain of 
application of social representations is not only the mind, but also the everyday world. 
Note that a relevant script was produced here by an individual subject using the elements of 
the social representation itself, as empirically determined (and this is what makes this 
discussion non-trivial). Relevance in context is ensured by the fact that each element of the 
SR is a paradigm in itself. For example Food is a paradigm of edible objects which may be 
encountered (with avatars9 from “ Apple ” to “Zest ”). The various avatars of each paradigm 
enable one to perform adequately by adapting the general schema to the local context. With 
the same social representation of eating, a given person is able to perform an adapted yet 
efficient sequence in very diverse situations, by choosing the relevant avatars of the required 
elements in the local context. Hence, a local application of the SR might be  
Faim / grignoter / fruit / buffet / santé  
hunger / nibble / fruit /buffet /health 
which accounts for the sequence “nibbling a fruit in a cocktail party because it’s the only 
healthy food available on the buffet” 
soif / aspire / boisson / abreuve 
thirst / sip / drink / quench 
which may be described as “ taking a drink to quench one’s thirst ”. Elements in the context 
may be recognized as local instances (“avatars”) of the paradigm, and/or arguments in 
performing the script10. 
Those scripts depend not only upon circumstances, but also upon groups. Free association on 
“ eating well ” -a prompt designed to elicit pragmatic association -, was asked to another 
                                                 
9 We call “ avatar ” a local instantiation of the social representation, as encountered in the world or in discourse. 
E.g. “this professor, Moscovici” is an avatar of the social representation of “the professor”. In Hindu religion, 
avatars were the forms of embodiment of Vishnu on earth. Although avatars may differ, they are all considered 
incarnations of the same entity. As a set of all its possible avatars, the social representation is a paradigm. 
10 I use the term “ script ” here in the vague sense of “ action program ”, and not in specific reference to one of 
the many specialized meanings given to this term by various authors the psychological or cognitive science 
literature. 
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sample, of 1600 French adults. We obtained eight typical scripts or action principles. Some 
groups favor certain scripts. The scripts obtained are only combinations of some elements of 
the SR of eating. Here are 3 examples: “ To eat what I like ” is made of Desire/Take, while 
“ To eat one’s fill ” is Take/Filling-up. “ (To eat) balanced and healthy ” is made of 
Take/Filling-up/Living. This last script is more frequently attested in women of our sample, 
while “To eat one’s fill” was more found in younger respondents. 
Social representations often display this amazing versatility: people can act in opposite ways 
while still using the same SR framework, by focusing on some aspects only. As we can see, 
natural evolution shaped social representation with unexpected properties, yet functional11. 
Their versatility enables communication, compromise and cooperation between parties with 
different attitudes (“ What You See Is What You Fancy” effect), but also flexibility in 
individual use (“ Swiss knife ” effect), although not anything is possible. All subjects possess 
all the elements in their individual representation, even if they do not use them on an 
everyday basis at a given period. Still, the other “ blades ” might be useful at another period 
of life, or in unusual conditions, e.g. adult married persons report coming back to bachelor’s 
minimal cooking practices when their mate and children are away. 
Notice how the empirical structure of the SR of eating performs the contradictory 
requirements of coordination mentioned in section 3.1: providing individual guidelines for 
behavior, adaptable to local contexts, and still that can be aggregated with others to co-
produce social events (meals). 
4.3.2 Individual and social representation 
We assume that social representation is a species of individual representations, in the 
biological sense. Social representations are to individual, mental, representations what a 
species (e.g., Dogs) are to a specific individual (e.g. this dog, “ Rex ”). A social 
representation is a population of individual representations, which are scattered over a 
population of humans12. Which comes first, the social representation or the mental 
representation? That’s a chicken and egg problem: What comes first, the dog, or the dog 
species? They are co-constructed, and hence co-dependent. There is no tabula rasa in cultural 
issues, and the social representation is such an issue 
What we (observers) call the pattern of the SR is the set of elements we perceive as common 
to the population of individual avatars (say, like a Dog -the species- has four legs, one tail 
etc.). In a sense, the SR is a construct of the observer, scientist or naïve layman of the street. 
But it is more than just an arbitrary set, because individual representations of the same object 
do have genetic and functional relations with one another: they are reproduced (by learning) 
from one another, and they crossbreed in the process of communication. 
                                                 
11 Not every actualization of SR is efficient. The magic though about food, including the incorporation principle 
[Rozin & Nemeroff, 1986; Fischler, 1990] seems to be an inappropriate, but frequent, application of the social 
representation of eating [Lahlou, 1998]. 
12 And, as we saw with the example of the dictionary, representations may inhabit other media than human 
beings.  
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This population of representations is distributed over the population of people. To use 
Moscovici’s expression, representations “ inhabit populations ”. This enables coordination. 
When two people, Ego and Alter, want to coordinate upon object X in a specific situation, 
they can communicate by referring to the social representation of X, through their own 
individual representations of X. As members of a same group, they assume to share the same 
social representation. And as we saw, they indeed do share at least the general framework, if 
not details. 
Defining social representations as a population of avatars is more than a metaphor. As said 
earlier, individual representations are actually generated by the reproductive propagation of 
other avatars of the same representation, like as in biological species [Lahlou, 1996b]. 
Avatars may undergo adaptive mutations, which will be diffused over the population when 
they bring a selective advantage; slightly different phenotypes may develop in some sub-
populations to adapt local conditions. In other words, it is because social representations are 
populations of avatars confronted with local pragmatics that they are fit for pragmatic 
purposes; it is because the local avatars of SR are individual representations that social 
representations are a tool for coordination of action in human groups. 
Now, let us look at “ eating ” again. First, consider the great similarity between what is 
obtained from a cultural source and from individuals, and between individuals. Individuals 
indeed refer to a single, cultural, paradigm. This was predicted by the theory, but empirical 
evidence is always welcome.  
But individual representations vary slightly from group to group, according to local 
specificity. In another survey, we asked a representative sample of the French population 
(2000 adults, face to face interviews at home) for free association on “ eating well ”, and 
found marginal differences by age and gender. High intake of energy and social content of the 
meal are more salient in people under 30, while those 60 and over make more associations on 
health and food limitation. Women insist on balanced and light food, while men mention rich 
food more often [Lahlou, 1998]. 
Figure 8: Items significantly over-represented in free association for “ eating well ” among 
inhabitants of France. 
Younger: bouffe (grub) copains (pals), restaurant, couscous, dessert, gâteau (cake)  
Elder: peu (few), sans (without), excès (excess), modérément (moderately), raisonnable 
(reasonable), cholesterol 
Women: équilibré (balanced), légumes (vegetables), sain (healthy), laitages (dairy 
products), vitamines (vitamins), kilos, lait (milk), varié (varied)  
Men: bon (good), foie gras (pâté), qualité (quality), banquet (feast), vin (wine), pomme. de 
terre (potato), français (French); choucroute (sauerkraut), sauce, frites (French fries), 
charcuterie (delicatessen) copains (pals), steak, canard (duck), restaurant, boeuf (beef) 
Subjects hereby reveal how they have internalized some widespread sociological norms and 
constraints (seniors should restrain on food, women should take care of their body, men 
should be “ bons vivants ” etc.). This link between practice involving some specific elements 
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of the social representation and the salience of those elements in the representation of the 
population involved has been shown many times [e.g. Guimelli, 1994]. Here, representation 
appears as a biological organ, of which certain parts would grow more salient with use, like a 
tennis player may grow a larger right arm.  
4.3.3 Social values 
Another function of the social representation is to ensure the existence and maintenance of the 
group (cf. supra section 3.2). Structural research showed that social representation can be 
described as an organized set of basic elements of two kinds, with a hierarchy [Abric, 1984, 
1994a & b]. The “ noyau central ” (kernel) contains essential elements; in their absence the 
subjects cannot recognize the object [Moliner, 1996]. For instance, a “ company ” must make 
profit [Flament, 1994], members of an “ ideal group ” must be friends, etc. Abric highlights 
that some elements of the kernel are values, and insists that what makes the group is the 
sharing of those values. By their very nature, social representations refer to some organizing 
elements that characterize the group. Note that attitudes towards these values may vary in the 
group, but still they stand as landmarks structuring the communication framework.  
In our example, “ eating ”, some elements will carry values that are fundamental for the 
group. Here, just the right satisfaction, without excess, as balance between not enough and too 
much, which constitute the filling-up element, is one of the basis of good social behavior, 
greed or undue asceticism being equally stigmatized in French society [Charuty, 1991]. 
Another element, “ Living ” is made almost only of moral values, as assessed by the typical 
terms: good, love, nice, taste, live, be, life, education, idea, enjoy, judgment, beauty, soul, 
moral, social, etc. (the full list includes God and other strong values). Ethnographic studies 
show how much eating practice is linked with social cohesion; even outside France, there are 
few social events without public food ingestion. Social identity includes eating habits. The 
role of “ eating ” as a social cement has been integrated in the very structure of the SR of 
“ eating ”. This ensures that every individual or group practicing “ eating ” will regenerate 
and maintain the group as such with those in-built guidelines. More generally, every social 
representation includes social dimensions that make the object a “ fait social total ”.  
As usual, structure sustains function, and function shapes structure; this makes no 
epistemological problem in SR theory.  
5. Conclusion 
The SR domain is an agitated crossroads: the social interaction between beings and things, 
and it is pretty uncomfortable to dwell in a crossroads. I have tried to show how the two 
interfaces which social representations contain (perception/action and individual/social) are 
connected  by the very function of social representations as a cooperation instrument for 
social groups.  
This functional approach complements the structural approach widely developed in our 
community. It also opens research perspectives. Most objects studied previously by SR theory 
are societal issues, and, as we have seen, this is where the theory is most efficient. But 
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considering social representations as cooperation tools suggests that SR theory might also be 
quite effective for studying collaboration at the scale of smaller communities, for instance in 
professional settings. 
 
